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Like many countries, the U.S. implements local content policies.  Through these policies, the 
U.S. government attempts to stimulate employment, especially in the manufacturing sector, 
by favoring U.S. contractors for public sector projects389 (Buy American regulations) and by 
insisting that these contractors themselves favor domestic suppliers of inputs such as steel 
(Buy America regulations).  We refer to these policies collectively as Buy America(n). 
Enforcement of the policies is via complex legalistic processes and often contractors to the 
U.S. government adopt a cautious approach by favoring U.S. suppliers even when this may 
not be strictly legally required.  In these circumstances, it is not possible to provide a 
definitive model-based quantification of the effects of Buy America(n).  Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated in this paper, a detailed CGE analysis can give valuable guidance concerning 
the efficacy of these policies.  In an illustrative simulation we find that scrapping Buy-
America(n) would reduce U.S. employment in manufacturing but boost employment in the 
rest of the economy with a net gain of about 300 thousand jobs.  Even in the manufacturing 
sector, there would be many winning industries including those producing machinery and 
other high-tech products.  Employment would increase in 50 out of 51 states and 430 out of 
436 congressional districts.    
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1.  Introduction 
As in many countries around the world, the federal government in the United States enacts 
policies which discriminate against imports in government procurement.  The aim is to 
protect U.S. industries, particularly manufacturing industries such as steel.  Since the Buy 
American Act of 1933 and earlier1, the U.S. federal government has endeavored to channel 
its expenditures on goods and construction projects towards U.S. suppliers.  This includes the 
federal government’s own direct purchases, as well as purchases by its instrumentalities such 
as Amtrak, together with purchases by state governments using federal funds.  While the Buy 
American Act operates on direct purchases by government agencies, more recent Buy 
America schemes operate on indirect purchases by constraining the input purchases made by 
firms which produce goods sold to government agencies. Through such Buy America 
schemes2, the U.S. government has tried to reach beyond the nationality of its direct suppliers 
through to the national origin of the inputs that they use.  For instance, U.S. contractors 
supplying construction projects to the public sector financed under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, the Obama stimulus package of 2009) were obliged to use 
U.S.-produced steel and other manufactured inputs.  As described in Koehl and Masini 
(2017), when the federal government purchases of an oven for a military mess, they inquire 
into the national origin of the component parts, such as the oven door handle.   
Implementation of Buy America(n) is governed by highly detailed regulations.  For example, 
the Secretary of Defense is required “to encourage increased domestic breeding while 
ensuring that military working dogs are procured as efficiently as possible and at best value 
to the government” (see Manuel et al., 2016).  Regulations at this level of detail are subject to 
expensive legal interpretations and litigation (see Koehl and Masini, 2017).  To us, they seem 
a fruitful area for legislators interested in finding regulations that can be scrapped when 
trying to comply with the spirit of President Trump’s demands for eliminating two 
regulations whenever a new one is introduced (see Mufson, 2017).   
Drawing on the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Hufbauer et al. (2013) 
summarizes the general aims of Buy America(n) as: 
 boosting domestic employment and economic growth through infrastructure 
spending; 
 protecting against unfair competition from foreign firms that receive subsidies from 
their governments; and 
 strengthening national security by promoting the iron and steel industries.   
In this paper, we abstract from the minutia of Buy America(n).  We use USAGE, a detailed 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, to throw light on the issue of whether such 
schemes could ever be expected to deliver on their objectives.  Hufbauer et al. (2013) list 
various obvious problems with Buy America(n) including higher costs to government, 
reduced bidding competition, project delays while compliance is being worked out, and 
potential international retaliation.3  But we assume that Buy America(n) works in a 
comprehensive transparent way and is tolerated by foreigners.  We show that even under 
these favorable conditions such schemes are likely to be counter-productive.      
                                                          
1  See Hufbauer et al. (2010), section 2.   
2 In this paper, we use the term “Buy America(n)” to refer generally to government provisions which favor local 
content in both direct and indirect public-sector purchases.   
3  Hufbauer and Schott (2009) and Baughman and Francois (2009) discuss how copycat adoption by foreign governments of 
local content schemes could lead to negative results from Buy America(n) for the industries such as iron and steel that they 
are intended to assist.   
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief introduction to USAGE.  
Section 3 explains our methodology, including how we represent Buy America(n) in 
USAGE.  Sections 4, 5 and 6 give USAGE results at the macro, industry and regional levels 
for an illustrative simulation of the effects of eliminating Buy America(n).  Concluding 
remarks are in section 7.   
2.  Why a model and why the USAGE model? 
We start by looking at the U.S. economy under the assumption that comprehensive Buy 
America(n) policies are in place.  Then we work out the effects of the policies by calculating 
how the economy would be affected if they were removed.   
The only feasible way of doing this is to apply a CGE model.  These models link all the 
various parts of the economy so that we can trace out how a switch towards imports in 
government-financed projects affects: 
 the balance of payment and the exchange rate; 
 output and employment in industries, such as iron and steel, that supply inputs to 
government projects and would be faced with greater import competition;   
 output and employment in other industries (induced multiplier effects) in regions 
specializing in supplying government projects;  
 output and employment in industries, such as export tourism, that would benefit from 
a lower exchange rate brought about by increased use of imports in government 
projects; and 
 the cost of any given volume of government projects, the public sector’s budgetary  
position and taxes and government expenditures.  
CGE models have been used previously to analyze related policies.  For example, Georges 
(2008) provided a CGE analysis of the effects of changes to the Rules of Origin (ROO) in 
NAFTA.  While related, analyzing Buy America(n) is different for two reasons: (i) the local 
content rules in Buy America(n) apply only to direct purchases by the government or inputs 
into commodities ultimately sold to the government (as opposed to the ROOs analyzed by 
Georges which apply independently of the user); and (ii) the domestic-value content must be 
100% (as opposed to that in Georges which can be less than 100% and vary by commodity).  
For our study the CGE model we chose to use is USAGE.  This is a 389-industry CGE model 
of the U.S. economy.4  It has been created over the last 15 years at the Centre of Policy 
Studies (CoPS), Victoria University, in collaboration with the U.S. International Trade 
Commission.5  The model has been used by and on behalf of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, the Canadian Embassy in Washington DC, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, 
Agriculture, Energy, Transportation and Homeland Security as well as private sector 
organizations such as the Cato Institute and the Mitre Corporation.  Issues analyzed using the 
model include the effects of: trade policies; environmental regulations; carbon taxes; energy 
security; illegal immigration; road infrastructure; Next-Gen aviation infrastructure 
expenditures; the Obama stimulus package; the National Export Initiative; an H1N1 
epidemic; security-related port closures; and a large number of terrorism scenarios.6  
In applications, USAGE initially produces results at the national level for the macro economy 
and industries.  USAGE then derives results at the state and congressional district levels 
                                                          
4  The theory underlying USAGE is based on Dixon and Rimmer (2002).  
5  Applications of USAGE by the U.S. International Trade Commission can be found in USITC (2004, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 
2013). 
6  Published USAGE papers include: Dixon and Rimmer (2010 and 2013); Dixon et al. (2007 and 2011); Fox et al. (2008); 
Gehlhar et al. (2010); and Zahniser et al. (2012).  
4 
 
using regional modules in a top-down fashion.  A top-down approach is appropriate for 
analyzing policies that do not have identifiable effects on relative production costs across 
regions.  National trade policies such as Buy America(n) fall into this category.  By contrast, 
policies implemented at the regional level, for example regional taxes, require the use of a 
bottom-up model such as USAGE-TERM, see for example Wittwer (2017).  When 
appropriate, top-down modelling has a key advantage over bottom-up: top-down allows 
computations to be carried out with far greater commodity and regional detail than bottom-
up.   
The theory of USAGE’s state-level top-down regional module is set out in Dixon et al. 
(2007).  In distributing results from the national level to the states, the regional module takes 
account of three factors.  The most important is the industrial composition of activity in each 
state.  If employment in a state is heavily concentrated in industries that are relatively harmed 
by the national shock under consideration [in this case the elimination of Buy America(n)] 
then the regional module will generate relatively large negative results for that state.  The 
second factor is interstate trade.  If a state relies heavily on exports to states that are 
negatively impacted by the shock under consideration, then on this account the regional 
module will generate negative effects for that state.  Finally, the regional module 
encompasses local multiplier effects.  If traded-goods industries in a state are relatively badly 
affected by the first two factors, then in the regional module, nontraded-goods industries (e.g. 
Retail trade) will also be relatively badly affected.    
Results are further disaggregated from the state level to the congressional district level using 
the simplest possible top-down approach.  It is assumed that the percentage change in jobs for 
residents in district r who work in industry j is the same as the percentage change in jobs for 
residents in the state to which r belongs who work in industry j.  Thus, variations in 
percentage changes in total employment across congressional districts within a state reflect 
differences in the industrial composition of activity across the state’s districts.     
 
3.  Representing Buy America(n) in the USAGE model 
Buy America(n) provisions operate on both direct purchases by government agencies and 
indirect purchases.  Direct refers to purchases made by government agencies while indirect 
refers to purchases made by firms in creating goods sold to government agencies.  For 
example, the government directly buys a mile of paved road and indirectly buys asphalt used 
by the contractors who supply the paved road.   
In practice, Buy America provisions (ie:  those concerned with indirect inputs to government 
suppliers) appear to have more important effects on the economy that Buy American 
provisions (ie:  those concerned with direct government purchases).  To a large extent, the 
goods purchased directly by the government face little competition from imports, even when 
purchased by the private sector.  As shown in Table 3.1, 43 per cent of direct government 
purchases of goods are construction projects ($341,980m out of $799,700m).  According to 
U.S. input-output data, construction imports are zero.7  For most of the remaining 57 per cent, 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that U.S. government purchases are barely 
less import intensive than purchases by the U.S. private sector. The government import share 
of purchases of non-construction goods is 27.6 per cent, only slightly less than the 
corresponding percentage for the private sector of 28.6 per cent (Table 3.1).  The limited 
effect of Buy American provisions is likely due to the fact that direct purchases by 
                                                          




governments are subject to U.S. free trade agreements like the Government Procurement 
Chapter of the NAFTA and other undertakings like the Agreement on Government 
Procurement negotiated through the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in 1979 which limit 
the ability of the U.S. government to use Buy American to discriminate against imports in its 
direct purchases (for more detail, see Muggenberg et al. (1993), among others).    
By contrast, detailed anecdotal data compiled by Trade Partnership Worldwide (TPW, 2016) 
and Hufbauer et al. (2010) suggest that Buy America(n) strongly affects the input decisions 
of suppliers to U.S. governments, especially suppliers of construction.  Not only are suppliers 
forced to bias their input purchases in favor of U.S. products, but they also experience 
considerable expense and inconvenience in establishing that their inputs comply with Buy 
America provisions.  These considerations suggest that U.S. governments pay more for goods 
because of Buy America than they would in the absence of these provisions.  For example, 
Hufbauer et al. (2013) estimate that over the three year period 2009-11, contractors to the 
U.S. government (and thus the U.S. government itself) paid $5.7 billion more for domestic 
steel embedded in ARRA infrastructure projects than they would have paid if they had been 
free to use comparable imported steel which was about 40 per cent cheaper.   
No quantitative evidence is available on the extent to which input decisions by goods 
suppliers to the U.S. government are biased against imports.  In this paper, we make what we 
consider to be plausible assumptions concerning this bias and then trace out the implications 
by using simulations conducted with the USAGE model.  
 
Table 3.1.  Commodity sales and import shares to the government and private sectors: 
estimates for 2015 
USAGE 













11 to 22 Construction 341980 0.000 1070158 0.000 
241 Petroleum refining 84821 0.239 404470 0.125 
164 Aircraft 30049 0.171 40894 0.362 
124 Search & navigation equip. 25564 0.197 24773 0.217 
117 Broadcast equip. 14350 0.982 60201 0.981 
170 Ships 11998 0.024 8409 0.028 
239 Printing 11484 0.102 47296 0.097 
23 Natural gas distribution 10446 0.000 107496 0.000 
208 Animal product processing 10441 0.067 145905 0.070 
263 Other chemicals 9859 0.265 48147 0.233 
167 Missiles 7934 0.055 5996 0.003 
152 Heavy trucks 7429 0.277 24561 0.292 
184 Surgical supplies 6479 0.401 35969 0.322 
255 Pharmaceuticals 6345 0.443 237059 0.444 
249 Other organic chemicals 6213 0.292 87319 0.278 
  All other goods 16434 0.313 5450166 0.297 
            
  Total 799700 0.158 7798818 0.247 
           
 Total less Construction 457720 0.276 6728661 0.286 
Source:  USAGE model database derived from Benchmark input-output tables for 2007 published by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) and imports matrix supplied by the BEA, updated to 2015 by USAGE simulation. 
We assume that Buy America(n) operates through Buy America rather than Buy American, 
that is through indirect purchases, rather than direct purchases. We assume that Buy 
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America(n) induces U.S. industries in supplying the U.S. government to use domestically 
produced inputs of goods (mining, construction and manufacturing) in preference to imported 
goods.  Put another way, we assume that abandonment of Buy America(n) would cause 
substitution towards imported inputs.   
In quantifying this assumption, we start by looking at flows of commodity inputs to each 
industry.  For example, Table 3.2 shows sales of Plumbing materials (USAGE commodity 
78) to current production in Power and communications structures (industry 29).  The total 
value of these sales in the 2015 USAGE database is $63.9 million.  The database shows that 
of this, $44.4 million was domestically supplied while $19.5 million was imported.  The 
USAGE database shows that 13 per cent of the sales of industry 29 was to government.8  In a 
CGE model like USAGE, production technology is defined at the level of the industry, not 
the firm, and for any given industry, the same technology is used to produce output sold to 
different industries/users.  On this basis, we assume that 0.13∙63.9 = $8.9 million of 
commodity 78 was sold to industry 29 to facilitate the industry’s production of goods for 
government.  This gives us the border for Table 3.2.  But where do we find information about 
the four numbers in the body of Table 3.2?  There are no direct data on this. 
 
Table 3.2.  Sales of Plumbing materials (C78) into Power & communication structures 
(I29), $million and (percentages)  
 government private  Total 
domestic 8.9 35.5 44.4 
 (100) (64.6) (69.5) 
import 0 19.5 19.5 
 (0)  (35.4)  (30.5)  
Total 8.9 55.0 63.9 
 (100)  (100)  (100)  
 
We assume that Buy America(n) programs are binding:  Imported inputs to production of 
goods destined for government are as small as possible.  In the case of C78-to-I29 we put 
zero in the “import” row and “government” column in Table 3.2.  Then the other three entries 
are determined.   
It is not always possible to put zero in the “import” row and “government” column.  In a few 
cases a zero in this position would lead to a negative in the (domestic, private) position.  This 
would happen with the border data in Table 3.3 for Broadcasting equipment (C117) into 
Educational & vocational structures (I30).  If we placed a zero in the (import, government) 
position then we would end up with -$117.9 m in the (domestic, private) position.  As shown 
in Table 3.3, the smallest number that can be placed in the (import, government) position is 
$117.9 m, leading to zero in the (domestic, private) position.    
 
 
                                                          
8  By “government” we mean the 9 government industries identified in the BEA input-output tables: Federal general 
government (defense), Federal general government (nondefense), Postal service, Federal government gas and electric 
utilities, Other federal government enterprises, State and local general government, State and local government operated 




Table 3.3.  Sales of Broadcasting equipment (C117) into Educational & vocational  
structures (I30), $ million and (percentages) 
 government private  Total 
domestic 5.6 0 5.6 
 (4.5) (0) (3.7) 
import 117.9 25.5 143.4 
 (95.5)  (100)  (96.3)  
Total 123.5 25.5 149.0 
 (100)  (100)  (100)  
 
Applying the principle that imported inputs of commodities into production of goods for 
government are as low as possible, we split all of the intermediate input flows of 
commodities to industries into four parts.  Table 3.4 is an aggregate representation.  It shows 
domestic and imported inputs sold to U.S. goods-producing industries and the split of these 
sales between inputs to production for government and to production for private.9  Table 3.4 
implies an import share of 4.2 per cent for commodity inputs into U.S. goods-producing 
industries for production of goods for government.  The import share for all other commodity 
inputs to U.S. goods-producing industries is 24.3 per cent.   
 
Table 3.4.  Commodity sales to U.S. goods-producing industries, $ million and 
(percentages) 
 government private  Total 
domestic 162,837.1  2,794,707.0  2,957,544.1  
 (95.8) (75.7) (76.6) 
import 7,054.4  898,075.4  905,129.8 
 (4.2)  (24.3)  (23.4)  
Total 169,891.5  3,692,782.4  3,862,673.9 
 (100)  (100)  (100)  
 
To simulate the effects of eliminating Buy America(n) programs, we introduce shocks to the 
USAGE model which move the import-domestic structure of inputs used for government 
sales closer to that used for private sales.  For example, we replace the 8.9 and 0 appearing in 
the “government” column of Table 3.2 with numbers that more closely align with the 
proportions exhibited in the “private” column.  More specifically, we assume that eliminating 
Buy America(n) would move the import share of industry j’s purchases of commodity c for 
government production towards that for private production according to:  
 
g pn o o
mg mg mp
g p g p
T (j) T ( j)
S (c, j) S (c, j) S (c, j)
T ( j) T ( j) T ( j) T ( j)
   
 
  (3.1) 
                                                          
9  Production for private means production of goods and services for sale to non-U.S.-government purchasers.   
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In this equation n
mgS (c, j)  is the new import share for commodity c purchased by industry j for 
production for government, and o
mgS (c, j)  and 
o
mpS (c, j)  are the original import shares for 
commodity c purchased by industry j for government and private.  If c is Plumbing materials 
(C78) and j is Power and communications structures (I29), then from Table 3.2 we see that 
the original import shares are 0 and 0.354.  Tg(j) and Tp(j) are the values of industry j’s output 
sold to government and to private.  For industry j equals I29, the share of (domestic plus 
imported) commodity C78 used to produce output for the government is 0.139 (= 8.9/63.9) 
while that for private users is 0.861 (= 55.0/63.9).  Application of (3.1) for the C78-to-I29 
case gives the new value for the import share in I29’s purchase of C78 for use in production 
for government of 0.30510:  
 n
mgS (C78, I29) 0.139 0 0.861 0.354 0.305       (3.2) 
Notice in (3.1) that we move Smg(c,j) close to 
o
mpS (c, j)  if private output accounts for a large 
share  of j’s production (Tp(j)/(Tg(j)+Tp(j)) in equation (3.1) is close to 1).  When most of j’s 
production is for the private sector, we consider that the domestic-import mix for inputs used 
by j to produce output for the private sector is strongly representative of the mix that j could 
use to produce output for the government in the absence of Buy America(n).  On the other 
hand, for an industry like I30 (Educational & vocational Structures) in Table 3.3, most of j’s 
production is for government, and we have little evidence of what would be possible in the 
absence of Buy America(n).  For these cases we cautiously assume that dropping Buy 
America(n) would make little difference to j’s choice of domestic-import mix of inputs used 
in production destined for government. For example, (3.1) dictates that for the Educational & 
vocational Structures industry, the import share of Broadcasting equipment for sales to 
government Smg(C117,I30) rises from 
o
mpS (c, j) = 0.955 to 
n
mpS (c, j) = 0.963.   
Apart from changing the shares Smg(c,j), we assume that eliminating Buy America(n) also 
produces efficiency gains.  This is because Buy America(n) prevents businesses from 
adopting an efficient choice between domestic and imported inputs in their production 
destined for government.  We assume that eliminating Buy America(n) would generate an 
efficiency gain associated with j’s choice of source for inputs of c in producing for 
government that is proportional to the change in the import share: 
 n o
mg mgEffGain(c, j) S (c, j) S (c, j)       (3.3) 
where  is a factor of proportionality assumed to be the same for all c and j.  The efficiency 
gain is assumed to operate as a reduction in the amount of commodity c required by industry j 
to produce any given level of output for government.  Apart from the commentary in 
Hufbauer et al. (2013) on the use of steel inputs during the ARRA, we know of no 
quantitative evidence on the extent of these gains.  We quantified the gains in our illustrative 
simulation by setting  = 0.25 in equation (3.3).  With this value, the efficiency gain for the 
two commodity-industry pairs illustrated in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are:  
  EffGain(C78, I29) 0.25 0.305 0 0.076    , 
  EffGain(C117, I30) 0.25 0.963 0.955 0.002    . (3.4) 
                                                          
10  Using (3.1) is equivalent to assuming that the new import share in industry j’s use of commodity c to produce output for 
government is the same as the initial share across industry j’s use of c for all production.   
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That is, eliminating Buy America(n) saves 7.6 per cent of industry I29’s post-Buy 
America(n) inputs of commodity C78 used to produce output for government.  But for an 
industry like I30 where most output is sold to government, equation (3.4) dictates that the 
efficiency gain will be much closer to zero.   
We applied (3.1) and (3.3) to obtain post Buy American four-quadrant flow matrices for each 
c and j.  For example, starting from Table 3.2, we computed the new C78-to-I29 table as 
Table 3.5.  The arithmetic underling Table 3.5 starts by using n
mgS (C78, I29)  and 
EffGain(C78,I29)  to estimate the (import, government) component as  
2.5 [=0.305 8.9  (1-0.076)].  The (domestic, government) component is estimated as 5.7  
[=(1-0.305) 8.9  (1-0.076)].   
By comparing the new four-quadrant (c,j) tables with the original tables we can deduce the 
impact effects on input flows of dropping Buy America(n).  These impact effects are 
computed under the assumption of no change in outputs.  Of course the major idea of 
conducting simulations is to work out how dropping Buy America(n) would affect industry 
outputs.  But for representing the import-domestic substitution and efficiency effects of 
dropping Buy America(n) we need to look at how input flows are affected at the initial level 
of industry outputs.   
 
Table 3.5.  Sales of Plumbing materials (C78) into Power & communication structures 
(I29) freed from Buy America(n), $million and (percentages)  
 government private  Total 
domestic 5.7 35.5 41.2 
 (69.5) (64.6) (65.2) 
import 2.5 19.5 22.0 
 (30.5)  (35.4)  (34.8)  
Total 8.2 55.0 63.2 
 (100)  (100)  (100)  
 
By comparing the “Total” column of the new (c,j) table (ie:  Table 3.5) with that of the 
original (c,j) (ie:  Table 3.2) we can calculate domestic-c-input-saving and import-c-input-
using technical change associated with dropping Buy America(n).  For (C78, I29) these 
technical changes are:   
 TC(C78, dom, I29) = 100  (41.2/44.4 - 1) =  -7.2%, (3.5) 
and  
 TC(C78, imp, I29) = 100  (22.0/19.5 - 1) =  12.8%. (3.6) 
We interpret (3.5) and (3.6) as meaning that eliminating Buy America(n) would allow I29 to 
achieve any given level of output by using 7.2 per cent less inputs of domestic C78 combined 
with 12.8 per cent more inputs of imported C78 while holding all other inputs constant. 
Following this method, we worked out technical changes for inputs of all commodities c, 
domestic and imported, to all non-government industries j.  These technical changes became 




4.  Simulating the elimination of Buy America(n) in the USAGE model: macro 
assumptions and results 
As explained in the previous section, we view the impact of the elimination of Buy 
America(n) as an array of technical changes.  These cause the substitution of imported inputs 
for domestic inputs and introduce efficiency gains associated with freeing industry choices 
between domestic and imported inputs.   
Before we can use USAGE to simulate the effects of any set of shocks (in this case 
technology shocks) we must set the closure.  This refers to the macroeconomic assumptions.  
The main closure choices we made for the simulation reported in this paper are as follows:  
(a) Wages, employment, aggregate capital and investment.  We assume that the policy [in 
this case eliminating Buy America(n)] does not affect real wages (wages deflated by 
the CPI).  But it can affect aggregate employment.  We also hold aggregate capital 
(quantity of buildings and machines in the U.S.) constant.  Thus, our simulation is 
designed to answer the question: with the elimination of Buy America(n), how many 
more jobs would the U.S. economy be able to support at current real wages with its 
current level of capital?  With capital held constant, we also hold aggregate 
investment constant (the rate of change of capital).   
(b) Public consumption, taxes and the public sector deficit.  Eliminating Buy America(n) 
would reduce the cost of construction projects and other goods to state and federal 
governments.11  We assume that governments do not change the quantity of their 
purchases.  Instead they return the cost savings to households through cuts in indirect 
taxes applying to consumption.  Thus, we hold real public consumption and the public 
sector deficit constant, with the efficiency gains due to elimination of Buy America(n) 
translated into tax cuts.   
(c) The balance of trade.  Eliminating Buy America(n) will stimulate imports.  We 
assume that the exchange rate will adjust to generate an offsetting stimulation in 
exports, leaving the balance of trade unchanged.  For understanding this assumption, 
it is helpful to think about savings and investment.  The balance of trade is not only 
the difference between exports and imports, but it is also the difference between 
savings and investment.  As already mentioned, we hold investment constant.  We 
also hold government savings constant (no change in the public-sector deficit).  There 
is no reason to suppose that eliminating Buy America(n) will have an identifiable 
effect on private savings.  We can conclude that for our simulation it is reasonable to 
assume no change in the savings-investment gap.  That is, it is reasonable to assume 
no change in the balance of trade.     
(d) The terms of trade.  As explained in the previous point, the elimination of Buy 
America(n) would stimulate exports.  If the policy were unilateral, then it would not 
affect the positions of foreign demand curves for U.S. products.  In these 
circumstances extra U.S. exports would mean lower prices.  That is, the U.S. would 
suffer a terms-of-trade loss (a reduction in the prices of its exports relative to its 
imports).   But unilateral elimination of Buy America(n) seems unlikely.  In recent 
decades, the U.S. has almost always made movements towards freer trade only as part 
                                                          
11  As explained in section 3, we represent the elimination of Buy America(n) as an array of shocks that affect industry 
technologies.  However, through the use of artificial tax variables we ensure that the cost savings arising from the technology 
shocks directly affect purchasers’ prices for government, not other purchasers’ prices.  In this way, we ensure that the cost 
savings flow entirely to government.   
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of bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, not unilaterally.12  Consequently in our 
simulation we assume that Buy America(n) is relaxed in the context of trade 
agreements that improve U.S. access to foreign markets sufficiently to avoid terms-of-
trade deterioration.   
(e) Private consumption and welfare.  In our simulation, public consumption (G), 
investment (I) and the trade balance (X – M) are held constant.  GDP, the amount of 
goods and services that the economy produces, is determined by technology (A), and 
inputs of capital (K) and labor (L).  Technology is treated exogenously and shocked, 
K is held constant and L is tied down by our assumption of constant real wages.  This 
leaves private consumption (C) determined as a residual in the GDP identity: 
  GDP = C + I + G + X – M. 
Under the assumptions of fixed G, I, X – M and K, the movement in C is a legitimate 
indicator of the welfare effect of a policy.  If eliminating Buy America(n) allows an 
increase in private consumption with no reduction in investment, public consumption 
and the trade balance and no requirement for extra capital, then we can conclude that 
the policy is welfare-enhancing.   
Table 4.1 sets out macro results from our simulation of eliminating Buy America(n).  
Reflecting our assumptions, the table reports zero results for G, I, K, the trade balance, the 
terms of trade and the real wage rate.  At first glance it might seem surprising that the results 
for real exports and real imports are not equal (1.139 compared with 0.953).  But these results 
are percentage effects.  In the USAGE database for 2015, exports are less than imports (the 
U.S. runs a trade deficit).  The slightly larger percentage movement in X compared with that 
in M is consistent with our assumption of no change in X-M.    
Eliminating Buy America(n) is a strongly pro-trade policy.  In Table 4.1 the percentage 
increases in imports and exports are approximately an order of magnitude larger than that in 
GDP.  The policy is also pro-employment.  We show two employment results in Table 4.1: 
“labor input” which increases by 0.117 per cent and “jobs” which increases by 0.161 per cent.  
Labor input takes into account not only changes in the number of jobs but also the wage rates 
for different jobs.  If one job has a wage rate twice that of another, then an extra job of the 
first kind contributes twice as much to labor input as an extra job of the second.  For a count 
of jobs they make equal contributions.  The percentage impact for jobs is greater than that for 
labor input because eliminating Buy America(n) stimulates employment in industries with 
high paid jobs less than in industries with low paid jobs.  We return to this topic in section 5 
in the discussion of industry results.  For explaining macro results, the labor input measure is 
the more relevant.  
GDP increases by 0.124 per cent.  There are two contributing factors: the increase in labor 
input and the improvement in technology.   With the linearly homogeneous production 
functions used in USAGE, these factors combine to determine the percentage increase in 
GDP via the equation:  
 L Kgdp a S S k     . (4.1) 
In this equation, gdp, a,  and k are percentage changes in GDP, A, L and K, respectively.  
SL and SK are the shares of labor and capital in GDP.  In the USAGE database these are about 
                                                          
12 The U.S. is one of many countries which apply local content restrictions on government procurement.  Recently-elected 
French President Emmanuel Macron has also backed a “Buy European” Act, restricting public procurement in the EU to 
companies with more than half their production in Europe (Bridges; 2017).  As an example of a multilateral effort to 
liberalize government procurement restrictions, the WTO’s revised Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) entered into 
force on 6 April 2014.  The GPA is an Agreement between 49 WTO members (including the U.S., along with another 29 
“observers”) to mutually open government procurement markets between parties.   
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0.6 and 0.4.  In Table 4.1, a equals 0.053,  equals 0.117 and k equals 0.  With these 
numbers, (4.1) closely reproduces the USAGE result for gdp.    
The improvement in technology is imposed in the simulation through the array of import-
using and domestic-saving technical changes that, as explained in section 3, represent the 
impact effect of eliminating Buy America(n).  That these technical changes should amount in 
aggregate terms to a GDP contribution of approximately 0.05 per cent can be understood by 
back-of-the-envelope arithmetic performed on Table 3.4.  Broadly, we are assuming a 20 
percentage point increase in the import share of commodity inputs used by U.S. industries to 
produce goods for sale to government [that is, a change from 4.2 per cent to approximately 24 
per cent, see the shares in the “import” row in Table 3.4 and equation (3.1)].  Applying 
equation (3.3) we get an efficiency gain of 5 per cent [recall that we have set the factor of 
proportionality  in equation (3.3) at 0.25].  This operates on $169,891.5m worth of inputs, 
giving a GDP boost of $8494m (= 0.05∙169,891.5m).  U.S. GDP is about $18 trillion.  This 
suggests that the efficiency gain contributes about 0.047 per cent (=100∙8.494/18,000) to 
GDP, close to the simulated contribution of 0.053 per cent.   
What about the increase in labor input?  In qualitative terms, we can understand why there is 
an increase in labor input in two steps.  First, the improvement in technology raises the 
marginal product of labor.  With real wages fixed, the marginal product of labor is now 
higher than the real wage rate.  This sets up an incentive to use more labor.  The second step 
is an increase in labor input which, with the given amount of capital, reduces the marginal 
product of labor.  Labor input increases until the capital/labor ratio has fallen sufficiently to 
return the marginal product of labor to the fixed real wage rate.  
 
Table 4.1.  Macro effects of eliminating Buy America(n), (%) 
Real private consumption (C) 0.191 
Real public consumption (G) 0 
Real investment (I) 0 
Real exports (X)  1.139 
Real imports (M)  0.953 
Real GDP  0.124 
Technology contribution (A) 0.053 
Labor input (L) 0.117 
Jobs 0.161 
Capital stock (K) 0 
Terms of trade  0 
Trade balance 0 
Real wage (CPI deflated) 0 
 
We can gain quantitative insight as to why Table 4.1 shows a labor input gain of 0.117 per 
cent by using two back-of-the-envelope equations.  The first defines , the elasticity of 











w and q are the percentage changes in the wage rate and the rental rate on capital; and  
 and k are, as before, percentage changes in L and K. 
In most CGE models, including USAGE,  is treated as a parameter for each industry.  It 
controls the sensitivity of the labor/capital ratio to movements in the factor price ratio.  The 
second useful back-of-the-envelope equation is  
 GDP L Kp S w S q a     , (4.3) 
In this equation, the only new notation is 
GDPp  which denotes the percentage change in the 
price deflator for GDP.  Equation (4.3) is an aggregate version of the zero-pure-profit 
condition which relates the producer prices of goods and services to input costs per unit of 
output.  In our back-of-the-envelope model, unit costs are increased by positive movements 
in the costs of using capital and labor and decreased by technology improvements that 
increase output per unit of input.    
With k fixed on zero, (4.2) and (4.3) imply that the percentage change in labor input should 
be given, approximately, by:  






     , (4.4) 
With real wages fixed we might expect w – GDPp to be zero.  As mentioned earlier, SK is 0.4. 
In USAGE,  is set at 0.5 for all industries.  Substituting these values into (4.4) and using the 





      (4.5) 
This is low as an estimate of the USAGE labor input result (of 0.117).  What is it that is 
happening in the model that is not accounted for in (4.5)?  Recall from point (a) in the macro 
assumptions listed earlier in this section that it is the wage rate deflated by the CPI, not the 
GDP price deflator, which is held constant.  With this in mind, we rewrite (4.4) as 
     C GDP C
K




       , (4.6) 
Referring to USAGE results not shown in Table 4.1 we find in our simulation that consumer 
prices fall relative to producer prices.  This result can be traced to our macro assumption (b) 
that the government returns the cost saving from eliminating Buy America(n) to households 
by reducing taxes on consumer goods.  Specifically, USAGE gives  
   GDP Cp p 0.023   (4.7) 
where pC is the percentage change in the CPI.  Using (4.7) in (4.6) and fixing the wage 
deflated by the CPI at zero, we obtain 
  
0.5
0 0.023 0.053 0.095
0.4
     . (4.8) 
This is still a little low.  As can be seen in the next section (Table 5.1), eliminating Buy 
America(n) favors export activity such as Export tourism (commodity C388) and Export 
education (C389).  These are labor intensive activities.  Eliminating Buy America(n) causes 
changes in the industrial composition of output that provide a boost to employment in 
addition to what can be explained in a simple one-sector back-of-the-envelope model.   
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The final macro result that we will explain is the increase in private consumption.  This is an 
important result because, as mentioned in point (e) of the macro assumptions, the increase in 
private consumption is a measure of the welfare benefit of eliminating Buy America(n).  
With G, I and X-M fixed, all of the increase in GDP accrues to private consumption.  
Because private consumption is about two thirds of GDP, the increase in GDP of 0.124 per 
cent, that we have already explained, translates into an increase in private consumption of 
about 0.19 per cent, approximately the result shown in Table 4.1.  
 
5.  Effects of eliminating Buy America(n) on U.S. output 
Table 5.1 shows the effects of eliminating Buy America(n) programs on U.S. outputs of 
selected commodities.  A priori we expected a large negative effect for U.S. output of any 
commodity c for which the technical change shocks TC(c,dom,j) calculated in section 3 are 
large negative numbers for industries j that are important customers for domestically 
produced commodity c.  More formally we expected output effects across all commodities c 
to be correlated with TCave(c) defined by:  
 
j Ind
TCave(c) R(c, j) TC(c,dom, j)

  , (5.1) 
where R(c,j) is the share of the total sales of domestically produced c that is absorbed by 
industry j as an intermediate input.   
The TCave(c) values are reported in the 3rd column of Table 5.1.  These values are large 
negatives for commodities such as Plumbing materials (C78) that face considerable import 
competition and rely for a major part of their sales on industries such as Power and 
communications structures (I29) for which the U.S. government is a major customer.  
Eliminating Buy America(n) would reduce domestic demand for these commodities because 
it would significantly free up their customers to substitute towards imports.  Table 5.1 
includes all commodities for which the absolute value of TCave is 2 or more.  Like Plumbing 
materials, most of these commodities are importable construction materials.   
While Buy America(n) is often cited as a way of protecting U.S. steel manufacturing, Table 
5.1 does not show Iron and steel manufacturing (C53) with a particularly large absolute value 
for TCave [TCave(C53) = -0.998].  While Iron and steel is importable, the USAGE database 
implies that sales to industries that are supplying the government is a relatively minor part of 
the commodity’s total sales.  This is consistent with Hufbauer et al. (2013) who estimated 
that over the three year peak ARRA period, 2009-11, sales of U.S. iron and steel to 
government financed projects were about $19.95 billion, an annual average of $6.65 billion 
(= 19.95/3).  Since other sources (e.g. U.S. input-output tables published by the BEA and 
shipments data) indicate that U.S. iron and steel production over the last decade or so has 
averaged about $120 billion per annum, it appears that sales of U.S. iron and steel to U.S. 
government infrastructure projects are only about 6 per cent of total sales. 
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Table 5.1.  Output effects (%) for selected commodities of Buy America cessation: USAGE & fitted results, and explanatory variables 
Commodity USAGE    Fitted TCave      Xsh Commodity USAGE       Fitted TCave      Xsh 
11 Forestry&Logging -1.424 0.173 0.000 0.111 134 LightFixtureManuf -8.826 -8.974 -9.582 0.123 
37 Sawmills&WoodPres -2.450 -1.746 -2.015 0.118 141 Motor&GeneratorMan -2.208 -2.281 -2.904 0.448 
38 VeneersPlywood -3.105 -2.763 -3.020 0.058 143 RelayManuf -2.468 -2.533 -3.164 0.445 
39 Millwork -1.312 -1.179 -1.337 0.032 146 Wire&CableManuf -4.078 -3.776 -4.425 0.405 
41 ClayRefracManuf -4.208 -4.044 -4.511 0.210 147 WiringDeviceManuf -6.066 -6.461 -7.167 0.337 
48 Abrasives -1.993 -1.927 -2.391 0.305 164 AircraftManuf 0.649 0.574 0.000 0.532 
49 CutStoneManuf -4.485 -4.785 -5.097 0.019 165 AircraftEngineManuf -2.685 -2.804 -3.647 0.645 
53 Iron&SteelManuf -1.388 -0.790 -0.998 0.100 166 OtherAircraftParts -2.728 -3.324 -4.287 0.743 
69 PowerBoilerManuf -1.708 -1.629 -2.000 0.226 208 AnimalProcessing 0.123 0.027 -0.125 0.082 
72 HardwareManuf -2.878 -2.656 -3.096 0.247 209 PoultryProcessing 0.201 0.128 -0.004 0.067 
77 Valves&Fittings -2.123 -2.064 -2.572 0.343 231 PulpMills -1.860 -2.140 -2.915 0.608 
78 PlumbingMaterials -5.927 -5.583 -5.975 0.062 275 RetailTrade 0.155 0.068 0.000 0.000 
82 OthFabMetalManuf -1.510 -1.501 -2.008 0.369 278 WaterTransport 0.471 0.068 0.000 0.000 
89 SemicondMachManuf 0.817 0.647 0.000 0.610 300 MonetAuth&DepCredit 0.247 0.118 0.000 0.052 
91 OfficeMachineryManuf 0.451 0.389 -0.104 0.443 301 NonDepCreditIntermed 0.223 0.134 0.000 0.069 
102 GearManuf -3.353 -3.475 -4.098 0.393 302 Sec&ComInter&Brkrg 0.378 0.246 0.000 0.187 
103 MechPowerTransm -3.435 -3.032 -3.540 0.299 303 OtherFinanInvestActivs 0.397 0.219 0.000 0.158 
104 OtherEngineEquip -1.652 -1.708 -2.224 0.368 304 InsuranceCarriers 0.255 0.096 0.000 0.030 
111 IndustrialFurnaceManuf 0.532 0.470 -0.162 0.585 305 InsuranceAgencBrokers 0.237 0.068 0.000 0.000 
112 FluidPowerMachinery -2.570 -2.447 -2.886 0.257 306 FundsTrusts 0.253 0.068 0.000 0.000 
114 ComputerStorageManuf -2.936 -2.955 -3.293 0.130 348 NursingHomes 0.241 0.068 0.000 0.000 
115 ComputerTerminals -1.845 -2.252 -2.841 0.416 361 Accommodation 0.191 0.068 0.000 0.000 
117 BroadcastingEquipment -0.247 -0.456 -1.426 0.882 362 FullServiceRestaurants 0.255 0.073 0.000 0.006 
118 OtherCommunEquip -2.405 -2.850 -3.328 0.277 363 LimServiceRestaurants 0.247 0.072 0.000 0.004 
120 OtherElecComponent -2.874 -3.021 -3.507 0.276 365 AutoRepair&Maint 0.229 0.068 0.000 0.000 
121 SemiconductorManuf -2.408 -2.744 -3.358 0.418 386 Holiday 0.339 0.068 0.000 0.000 
125 EnviroControlManuf -4.603 -4.881 -5.330 0.153 387 ForeignHoliday 0.400 0.068 0.000 0.000 
128 ElecTestInstruments -1.448 -1.669 -2.454 0.641 388 ExportTourism 1.144 1.019 0.000 1.000 
130 RadiationApparatManuf 0.625 0.528 -0.001 0.484 389 ExportEducation 1.038 1.019 0.000 1.000 
133 ElecLampBulbManuf -1.836 -1.924 -2.574 0.492 390 OtherNonResidential -0.030 1.019 0.000 1.000 
* Commodities in USAGE are numbered from 1 to 392.  This table lists selected commodities, those mentioned in the text and all those for which TCave 

















C278  Water transport
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In addition to TCave(c), we expected export orientation to play a role in determining the 
USAGE results for commodity outputs.  As we saw in section 4, scrapping Buy America(n) 
would have a large positive effect on U.S. exports.  Consequently, a priori we expected 
USAGE output effects across commodities, c, to be positively correlated with the share of c’s 
sales accounted for by exports, Xsh(c). 
To test our expectations concerning the USAGE determination of commodity output results, 
we ran the regression: 
 0 1 2y(c) TCave(c) Xsh(c)      ,  for cGCOM (5.2) 
where 
GCOM is the set of 389 “genuine” USAGE commodities, excludes Scrap, Secondhand 
goods and Non comparable imports;  
y(c) is the USAGE result for the percentage effect on U.S. output of commodity c from 
eliminating Buy America(n); and 
0, 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated.  The expected signs of 1 and 2 are 
positive. 
The resulting regression equation is: 
y(c) 0.068 0.956 TCave(c) 0.951 Xsh(c)     ,    R2 = 0.952 (5.3) 
The coefficients 1 and 2 have the expected signs and the equation explains 95.2 per cent of 
the variance across commodities of the USAGE results.  This indicates that our prior 
expectations correctly anticipated most of what is important in explaining these results.   
Nevertheless, it is informative to try to work out what explains the remaining 4.8 per cent of 
the variance.  Put another way, we want to investigate what USAGE knows that is not 
included in the regression equation.    
The process of conducting this investigation is facilitated by examining Figure 5.1.  The smooth 
line shows the USAGE results for commodity outputs ranked from the worst affected at the 
left hand side to the most favorably affected at the right hand side.  The jagged line shows fitted 
regression values from equation (5.3).  The gaps reflect factors in USAGE that are relevant to 
the results but are not accounted for in the regression.   
To illustrate the process of locating these factors, we examine a few of the large gaps in 
Figure 5.1, beginning with Forestry and logging (C11).  The USAGE result (see Table 5.1) 
for this commodity is a contraction of 1.424 per cent.  The fitted result is an expansion of 
0.173 per cent, reflecting a TCave value of zero and an Xsh value of 0.111.  So where is the 
bad news that causes USAGE to generate an unfavorable result?  Over 50 per cent of U.S. 
production of Forestry and logging is sold to industries producing Sawmills, Veneers & 
plywood and Millwork (C37-C39).  These three commodities are used in construction 
projects for government.  Consequently, they have relatively large negative TCave values and 
correspondingly large negative output results in the USAGE simulation.  This input-output 
link adversely affects Forestry and Logging and is taken into account by USAGE but not by 
the regression in equation (5.3).  
Next we look at Other non-residential (C390).  This is an amalgam of services provided to 
international organizations and their foreign employees located in the U.S.  It includes direct 
purchases by organizations such as the World Bank and expenditures on accommodation, 
food, etc. by foreign World Bank officials.  The export share for this artificial commodity is 
100 per cent.  Consequently, the regression equation predicts a positive outcome for C390, a 
0.983 per cent output expansion, due to elimination of Buy America(n).  Unlike the 
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regression, USAGE knows that the volume of activity by international organizations in the 
U.S. is not affected by U.S. competitiveness in U.S. markets. Consequently, the USAGE 
result is close to zero.   
The final commodity that we will consider here is Water transport (C278).  USAGE shows 
output expansion of 0.471 per cent.  Water transportation receives no protection from Buy 
America(n) and its export share is zero.  Consequently, the regression result for Water 
transportation is simply the regression intercept, 0.068.  The factor missing from the 
regression is the link between Water transport and international trade.  The stimulation of 
trade is good for Water transportation because this service is used to move traded goods 
around the U.S. coast and along its internal waterways.   
The process of comparing USAGE and fitted results for individual commodities can 
encompass any commodity of interest to a policy maker or analyst.  This process is important 
for understanding what is included in the model and assessing the realism of the results.   
With regard to employment effects by industry, our simulation shows that eliminating Buy 
America(n) results in job losses of 57,424 for Manufacturing, offset by substantial gains 
across the service sectors.13 The net result for jobs is a gain of 306,341 (0.161 per cent).  Put 
another way, Buy America(n) supports 57,424 manufacturing jobs at the cost of 363,765 jobs 
(= 306,341 +57,424) in the rest of the economy.   
As mentioned in section 4, industry results are the key to the difference in the two macro 
employment results reported in Table 4.1:  0.117 per cent for labor input and 0.161 for jobs.  
The manufacturing sector has higher wages per job than the economy as a whole.  Within the 
30 shaded manufacturing commodities in Table 5.1, those with the largest negative technical 
change values TCave (indicating the highest protection afforded by Buy America(n) 
programs) are all produced by industries that have at least average wages per job.  Most of 
these industries have considerably greater-than-average wages.  On the other hand, many of 
the industries that would benefit from eliminating Buy America(n) through an expansion in 
consumption are those that provide consumer goods and services.  These include the 
industries producing:  Retail trade (C275), Restaurants (C362 & C363), Nursing homes 
(C348), Accommodation and hotels (C361) and Auto repairs (C365).  Production of these 
commodities is undertaken by industries in which wages per job are less than the economy-
wide average.  With the elimination of Buy America(n) favoring industries with low wages 
per job, relative to those with high wages per job, the percentage stimulation of jobs is 
projected to be greater than that in labor input.   
6.  Effects of eliminating Buy America(n) on employment in states and congressional 
districts 
Table 6.1 shows job effects in the 51 states (includes the District of Columbia) from 
eliminating Buy America(n) calculated by the top-down method outlined in section 2.  It is 
the nature of trade policies to reallocate employment between a country’s regions.  This is 
because trade policies reallocate resources between a country’s industries and for many 
industries, especially those producing traded goods, there is strong regional specialization.  
Regions specializing in industries that gain from a trade policy are winners and those 
specializing in industries that are harmed by the policy are losers.  So it is a rare trade policy 
from which we would expect every region to win.  But eliminating Buy America(n) comes 
                                                          
13 See Table 5.2 in Dixon et al. (2017) for detailed employment effects by industry from eliminating Buy America(n) 
programs.   
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close.  Table 6.1 shows 50 winning states out of 51. Results at the congressional district level, 
presented in in Dixon et al. (2017) show 430 winning congressional districts out of 436.   
The first column in Table 6.1 shows job gains (a small loss in Oregon).  These total 306,337, 
representing a 0.161 per cent of the 190 million U.S. jobs in 2015.14  The second column 
expresses the job gains as percentages.  The third column shows the deviation in the 
percentage result for each state from the national result:  that is, the state result less 0.161.  
Columns (4) and (5) help us to understand column (3).  They aim to show why some states 
have a more-than-average percentage gain while others have a less-than-average gain.   
A state’s percentage gain relative to the national gain depends on two factors: its mix of 
industries and the performance of its industries relative to the national performance of those 
industries.  A state does well relative to the nation if:  (i) it has a mix of industries containing 
a relatively high share of gaining industries; and (ii) its industries in general do better than 
their counterparts in the rest of the U.S.  To disentangle these two factors, we start by writing 
the relative percentage gain appearing in column (3) of Table 6.1 for each state r as: 
 Relative gain(r) e(r)- e(nation) ,   (6.1) 
where  
e(r) is the percentage gain for state r; and  
e(nation) is the national percentage gain of 0.161 per cent.   
Next we express the state and national gains as weighted averages of the state and national 
gains at the industry level.  This leads to 
 
j j
Relative gain(r) JSh( j, r) e( j, r) JSh( j) e( j, nation)     ,  (6.2) 
where  
JSh(j,r) is industry j’s share in jobs in state r; 
JSh(j) is industry j’s share in jobs in the nation;  
e(j,r) is the percentage change in jobs in industry j in state r; and  
e(j,nation) is the national percentage change in jobs in industry j. 
 
Equation (6.2) can be rewritten as: 
   
j j
Relative gain(r) JSh( j, r) JSh( j) e( j,nation) JSh( j, r) e( j, r) e( j,nation)       , (6.3) 
The first term on the right hand side is the mix effect [column (4) of Table 6.1].  It is positive 
if state r has a relatively high share of its jobs in industries such as retail trade that do well at 
the national level and a relatively low share in industries such as plumbing materials that do 
poorly at the national level.  The second term on the right hand side is the relative 
performance effect [column (5) of Table 6.1].  It is positive if state r has sufficient industries j 




                                                          






Table 6.1.   Employment effects by state of Buy America(n) programs: 
USAGE results and explanatory decomposition 
  









  (1) (2) (3) = (4)+(5) (4) (5) 
1 Alabama           1,026  0.0488 -0.112 -0.030 -0.082 
2 Alaska             980  0.1759 0.015 0.009 0.006 
3 Arizona           4,030  0.1293 -0.032 -0.001 -0.030 
4 Arkansas           1,181  0.0822 -0.079 -0.020 -0.058 
5 California         57,403  0.2428 0.082 0.008 0.074 
6 Colorado           5,099  0.1545 -0.007 0.012 -0.019 
7 Connecticut           4,000  0.1450 -0.016 0.004 -0.020 
8 Delaware           1,714  0.2552 0.094 0.045 0.049 
9 Florida         26,526  0.2782 0.117 0.033 0.084 
10 Georgia         11,940  0.2342 0.073 0.011 0.062 
11 Hawaii           2,738  0.2892 0.128 0.038 0.090 
12 Idaho             490  0.0705 -0.091 -0.024 -0.066 
13 Illinois           9,006  0.1106 -0.050 -0.001 -0.050 
14 Indiana           1,984  0.0594 -0.102 -0.034 -0.068 
15 Iowa           1,974  0.1078 -0.053 -0.001 -0.052 
16 Kansas             953  0.0587 -0.102 -0.016 -0.087 
17 Kentucky           2,369  0.1173 -0.044 -0.010 -0.033 
18 Louisiana           2,967  0.1236 -0.037 -0.016 -0.022 
19 Maine             872  0.1341 -0.027 0.004 -0.031 
20 Maryland           7,432  0.1987 0.038 0.022 0.016 
21 Massachusetts           8,565  0.1621 0.001 0.014 -0.013 
22 Michigan           6,365  0.1294 -0.032 -0.010 -0.022 
23 Minnesota           3,155  0.0846 -0.076 -0.010 -0.067 
24 Mississippi           1,426  0.1158 -0.045 -0.008 -0.038 
25 Missouri           3,151  0.0945 -0.067 0.016 -0.083 
26 Montana             788  0.1624 0.001 0.013 -0.012 
27 Nebraska           2,153  0.1654 0.004 0.020 -0.016 
28 Nevada           4,361  0.2395 0.078 0.036 0.042 
29 New Hampshire             840  0.1084 -0.053 -0.011 -0.042 
30 New Jersey         12,654  0.2116 0.051 0.028 0.023 
31 New Mexico           1,283  0.1293 -0.032 -0.001 -0.031 
32 New York         40,966  0.2716 0.111 0.044 0.066 
33 North Carolina           5,649  0.1058 -0.055 -0.014 -0.041 
34 North Dakota             846  0.1506 -0.010 0.002 -0.013 
35 Ohio           2,950  0.0459 -0.115 -0.030 -0.085 
36 Oklahoma           1,456  0.0780 -0.083 -0.028 -0.056 
37 Oregon -3,247  -0.1378 -0.299 -0.173 -0.126 
38 Pennsylvania     11,576  0.1510 -0.010 0.005 -0.015 
39 Rhode Island      1,066  0.1633 0.002 0.021 -0.018 
40 South Carolina      4,797  0.2359 0.075 -0.037 0.112 
41 South Dakota       938  0.1740 0.013 0.032 -0.019 
42 Tennessee        3,298  0.0985 -0.063 -0.005 -0.058 
43 Texas         15,536  0.1049 -0.056 -0.024 -0.032 
44 Utah           1,501  0.0968 -0.064 -0.021 -0.043 
45 Vermont             486  0.1366 -0.025 0.005 -0.029 
46 Virginia         11,681  0.2155 0.054 0.007 0.047 
47 Washington           8,538  0.1907 0.030 -0.043 0.073 
48 West Virginia           1,725  0.1232 -0.038 -0.001 -0.037 
49 Wisconsin           2,460  0.0384 -0.123 -0.027 -0.095 
50 Wyoming             835  0.1111 -0.050 -0.020 -0.030 
51 Dist. of Columbia           3,854  0.2267 0.066 0.048 0.018 
 Total or average        306,337    0.1610 0 0 0 
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The states with the best mix of industries [those with the highest positive entries in column 
(4)] from the point of view of benefitting from eliminating Buy America(n) are District of 
Columbia, Delaware, New York, Hawaii, Nevada and Florida.  These states have little 
employment in industries that supply materials to government construction projects.  On the 
other hand they have an over-representation of industries supplying tourism services (C386-
388), financial services (e.g. C300-306) and other services that benefit from the overall 
expansion of consumption.  States with the worst mix of industries [largest negative entries in 
column (4)] are Oregon, Washington and South Carolina.  These states have an over-
representation of industries producing construction materials (e.g. C37, C38 and C41), 
electrical equipment (e.g. C146-147) and computing equipment (e.g. C114-115), all of which 
contract or have below-average expansion in Table 5.1.     
To a large extent the performance column (5) in Table 6.1 magnifies the mix effect. If a state 
has a favorable mix of industries, then multiplier effects will help all of the industries in the 
state towards a percentage expansion greater than that for the nation.  However, as shown in 
Figure 6.1 which plots the mix effect in column (4) against the performance effect in column 
(5), there is not a tight relationship.  For 14 of the 51 states, the performance column has the 
opposite sign from the mix column:  The corresponding dots in Figure 6.1 are in the north-
west or south-east quadrants.  For Oregon, the performance and mix effects have the same 
sign (negative) but the performance effect is noticeably muted relative to the mix effect.   
We explain these results for the four leading outliers marked in Figure 6.1:  Washington, 
South Carolina and Oregon whose dots are well north of where we would expect on the basis 
of their mix effect (that is, north of the trend line through the bulk of the dots in Figure 6.1) 
and Missouri whose dot is far south of where we would expect.  Put another way, we explain 
what aspect of the U.S. economy USAGE is capturing that causes it to give industries in 
Washington, South Carolina and Oregon stronger performance effects than could be 
explained taking account of multiplier effects and why the reverse is true for Missouri.   
The explanation focuses on export orientation.  We find that industries in Washington, South 
Carolina and Oregon generally have higher export shares in their outputs than is true for the 
corresponding industries at the national level, while the opposite is the case for Missouri.15  
To illustrate, consider the commodity Semi-conductors (C121).  While all four states produce 
this commodity, the export shares in their outputs are quite different.  For Oregon, South 
Carolina and Washington they are 0.47, 0.70 and 0.63, all above the national share which is 
0.42.  For Missouri the export share is 0.13, well below the national share.  As explained 
already, eliminating Buy America(n) stimulates exports to a far greater extent than it 
stimulates the economy in general (see Table 4.1).  If industry j in state r has a high export 
share in its output relative to industry j in the nation then, on this account, USAGE will 
project a better outcome for industry j in state r from eliminating Buy America(n) than it 
projects for industry j nationally.  In other words, high export orientation is a positive factor 
in determining industry performance.   
What determines differences in export orientation?  In USAGE, states with easy access to 
major ports tend to have relatively high export shares in the outputs of each of their 
industries.  This applies to Oregon, South Carolina and Washington.  Both South Carolina 
                                                          
15  The USAGE database contains estimates of commodity flows between states, denoted as FLOW(c,”dom”,r,d),  the value 
of commodity c produced in state r and shipped to state d (includes r to r).  Using the flow estimates together with estimates 
of the share of c received in r that is exported, EXIT_SH(c,d), we calculate state r’s export share in its production of 
commodity c according to 
d dd
FLOW(c,"dom",r,d) EXIT_SH(c,d) FLOW(c,"dom",r,dd)     
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and Washington have major ports while Oregon has easy access to the port in Washington.  
Missouri has an inland port for handling trade in bulk commodities.  However, Missouri’s 
considerable manufacturing industries produce commodities such as Aircraft (C164), Animal 
processing (C208) and Poultry processing (C209) which do not have easy access to suitable 
international ports and are therefore focused on the U.S. domestic market.  This gives them 
export shares in their production that are low relative to national shares.   
 
Figure 6.1.  Performance effect related to mix effect   
 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
Like all local content programs for government procurement, Buy America(n) schemes are 
seductively attractive to politicians and the public more generally.  What could possibly be 
wrong with channeling public expenditures towards U.S. producers?  Economic modelling 
helps us to understand what is wrong.   
Buy America(n) increases the costs to the U.S. government of infrastructure projects.  With 
binding budget constraints, this means that governments can undertake a lower volume of 
projects than would otherwise be possible.  By eliminating Buy America(n), the government 
could undertake more projects or, as modeled in this paper, return the savings to the private 
sector in the form of tax cuts.  As shown in our modeling, returning the savings in this way 
would allow a greater level of employment at any given average real wage rate.  
Alternatively, we could have modelled the benefit of reducing the cost of government 
projects as an increase in real wage rates while holding aggregate employment constant.    
With the discipline of an economic model, it is clear that Buy America(n) fails as a policy to 
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policy for safeguarding national security by boosting key manufacturing industries?  Iron and 
steel is often mentioned in this context.  There is no need for us to take a position on whether 
the concept of key industries is legitimate.  What our results show is that U.S. manufacturing 
is not strongly dependent on Buy America(n).  Eliminating Buy America(n) reduces 
manufacturing jobs by 0.439 per cent (57 thousand jobs).  For iron and steel the reduction is 
1.388 per cent (16 hundred jobs).  The industries with the biggest percentage job losses in the 
simulation described in this paper are Light fixtures (C134), Plumbing materials (C78) and 
Wiring devices (C147).  Job losses in these three industries would be about 9 per cent (9 
hundred jobs) for Light fixtures, 6 per cent (12 hundred jobs) for Plumbing materials and 6 
per cent (8 hundred jobs) for Wiring devices.  We conclude that Buy America(n) offers U.S. 
manufacturing industries a small level of protection against import competition.  This level of 
protection is not only small, but it is also expensive.  By protecting 57 thousand 
manufacturing jobs, Buy America(n) leaves the rest of the economy with 363 thousand fewer 
jobs than it would otherwise have had.  If U.S. policy makers have legitimate security 
concerns centered on the viability of U.S. manufacturing, then these could be addressed in a 
more cost efficient manner.    
Trade policies are often contentious.  There are always losers.  Scrapping Buy America(n) 
would move resources (capital and labor) away from industries that produce inputs to 
construction projects and are import competing.  But there are also winners.  The exchange-
rate effect would help resources more towards export-oriented industries.  This includes 
many in the manufacturing sector such as those producing various types of machinery.16  
Over 40 percent of the manufactured commodities and nearly all of the non-manufactured 
commodities have positive results.  Reflecting this wide spread of positive results across 
industries, USAGE shows wide-spread positive results across regions.  Fifty out of 51 states 
and 430 out of 436 congressional districts would gain jobs).    
Eliminating Buy America(n) would be good for the U.S.  It would also be good for other 
countries.  This is not just because other countries would have better access to U.S. markets 
for manufactured construction materials.  More importantly, the U.S. would set an example 
that would help to forestall Buy Canada, Buy Mexico, Buy EU, etc.    
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